Evaluation of a New International Policy Instrument to Curb Offshore Tax Evasion: Global Information Sharing of Bank Information

By Hjalte Fejerskov Boas, a PhD scholar in Economics on the College of Copenhagen, Niels Johannesen, Professor of Economics and Enterprise, Professor of Economics at College Of Copenhagen, Claus Kreiner, Professor of Economics and Director of Middle for Financial Conduct and Inequality (CEBI) at College Of Copenhagen, Lauge Larsen, PhD scholar at Division of Economics, College of Copenhagen, and Gabriel Zucman, rofessor of economics on the Paris College of Economics. Initially printed at VoxEU.

Whereas the monetary secrecy of offshore tax havens has traditionally created ample tax evasion alternatives for rich people, computerized data change between tax authorities is an formidable try and make tax enforcement attainable. This column summarises describes how data change creates massive enhancements in tax compliance by repatriation of offshore wealth, self-reporting of offshore monetary revenue, and audit efforts focused offshore evasion.

Prior to now decade, greater than 100 nations – together with all vital offshore monetary centres – have adopted computerized change of financial institution data. They now systematically acquire details about financial institution accounts owned by foreigners and routinely present this data to the related international tax authorities. The data change issues private monetary wealth, whether or not held straight or not directly by a holding firm, a belief, or related.

The target of computerized data change is to curb offshore tax evasion, an vital coverage problem in a globalised world. Empirical analysis paperwork that private wealth in offshore tax havens quantities to trillions of {dollars} (e.g. Zucman, 2013), that it belongs overwhelmingly to the very wealthiest people (e.g. Alstadsæter et al. 2018a, 2018b, 2019) and that it has – at the least till not too long ago – largely evaded taxation.

In a current paper (Boas et al., 2024), we examine the results of computerized data change on tax compliance. Our laboratory is Denmark, the place we create a singular information infrastructure overlaying all of the 300,000 data experiences on international financial institution accounts obtained by the Danish authorities, matched to micro-data on revenue, wealth, and cross-border financial institution transfers for the roughly 5 million grownup taxpayers.

Repatriation

We first ask whether or not computerized data change induced taxpayers with offshore financial institution accounts to repatriate property, levering the transaction information on cash transfers from tax havens.

As proven in Determine 1, transfers from folks’s personal accounts in tax havens (‘repatriations’) elevated differentially relative to different transfers from tax havens (‘different transfers’) from 2013. This factors to sturdy repatriation responses induced by the G20 resolution to make computerized data change the brand new world customary and the next efforts to implement this resolution.

Determine 1 Repatriation

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We additionally doc that repatriations from tax havens had been related to one-to-one will increase in whole wealth on the tax return and commensurate will increase in taxable capital revenue and tax liabilities. This means that the repatriations come from non-compliant accounts and contain a rise in tax compliance.

Self-Reporting

We then think about whether or not taxpayers who didn’t repatriate their international property turned extra prone to self-report the monetary revenue on international accounts on the onset of computerized data change.

As proven in Determine 2, we observe a pointy improve within the variety of taxpayers self-reporting any international monetary revenue on their tax return coinciding with the start of computerized data change in 2016-2017. Certainly, the variety of self-reporters roughly tripled in a short while window.

Determine 2 Self-Reporting

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We interpret the rise in self-reporting international monetary revenue as taxpayer responses to data change. We offer two varieties of proof to bolster this interpretation:

  • First, we think about individually cohorts of taxpayers who had been handled at completely different time limits as a result of staggered adoption of computerized data change amongst international counterpart nations. For every cohort, the sharp improve in self-reporting coincides with the primary 12 months of knowledge change.
  • Second, we doc clear self-reporting responses to letters despatched out by the Danish tax authorities informing taxpayers that they’ve obtained an data report a few international checking account.

Whereas the outcomes suggest that a lot of taxpayers have develop into compliant by self-reporting, the implications for income look like modest. This displays that the rise in self-reporting is pushed by taxpayers with low ranges of international monetary revenue, as proven in Determine 3.

Determine 3 Self-Reporting by International-Revenue Vary

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Improved Audits

Lastly, we examine the scope for detecting offshore tax evasion extra successfully in audits that focus on international monetary revenue and lever the brand new details about international accounts.

In collaboration with the Danish tax authorities, we design an audit effort that targets a random subset of the taxpayers for whom a comparability of tax returns and international data experiences suggests materials tax evasion. Particularly, we choose 500 taxpayers for audits amongst all taxpayers the place curiosity and dividend revenue reported by international banks exceed international curiosity and dividend revenue reported on the tax return by the taxpayers themselves by greater than 5,000 Danish krone.

The audit outcomes enable us to estimate the offshore tax evasion that the tax authorities might doubtlessly detect by this kind of audit effort as a result of new data experiences from international banks. Our outcomes reveal a big audit potential, however of a smaller magnitude than the opposite results, doubtlessly reflecting that enormous sums have already develop into compliant by repatriation and self-reporting.

Dialogue

Combining the estimates from the varied empirical designs, we conclude that computerized data change has closed round two-thirds of the offshore tax hole in Denmark. Repatriations seem to make the largest contribution to elevated tax compliance however self-reporting and improved audits additionally play a non-negligible position.

This implies that computerized data change is a comparatively profitable strategy to tackling offshore tax evasion. That is notably the case when evaluating to earlier coverage approaches, which have largely failed (Oldenski et al. 2011, Johannesen 2014, Johannesen and Zucman 2014, Johannesen et al. 2020). In comparison with home third-party reporting, nevertheless, cross-border data change nonetheless leaves massive room for non-compliance (Kleven et al. 2011). In our paper, we focus on completely different attainable explanations.

It is very important emphasise that our findings don’t essentially lengthen to different nations. Specifically, creating nations with much less capability to course of data experiences from international banks might profit much less from computerized data change (Johannesen 2024).

References out there on the authentic.

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